Historically, laws and policies to criminalize drug use or possession were rooted in explicit racism, and they continue to wreak havoc on certain racialized communities. We are a group of bioethicists, drug experts, legal scholars, criminal justice researchers, sociologists, psychologists, and other allied professionals who have come together in support of a policy proposal that is evidence-based and ethically recommended. We call for the immediate decriminalization of all so-called recreational drugs and, ultimately, for their timely and appropriate legal regulation. We (...) also call for criminal convictions for nonviolent offenses pertaining to the use or possession of small quantities of such drugs to be expunged, and for those currently serving time for these offenses to be released. In effect, we call for an end to the “war on drugs.”. (shrink)

In our recent article, together with more than 60 of our colleagues, we outlined a proposal for drug policy reform consisting of four specific yet interrelated strategies: (1) de jure decriminalization of all psychoactive substances currently deemed illicit for personal use or possession (so-called “recreational” drugs), accompanied by harm reduction policies and initiatives akin to the Portugal model; (2) expunging criminal convictions for nonviolent offenses pertaining to the use or possession of small quantities of such drugs (and releasing those serving (...) time for these offenses), while delivering retroactive ameliorative relief; (3) the ultimate legalization and careful regulation of currently illicit drugs; and (4) the delivery of a new “Marshall Plan” focused on community-building initiatives, expanded harm reduction programs, and social and health care support efforts (Earp et al. 2021). We were gratified to see so many thoughtful commentaries on our proposal, and we respond to them in part in this reply. (shrink)

Boundary colors are observed when light from a scene is dispersed by a prism or diffraction grating. We discovered that patterns with repeating black and white stripes can produce repeating bands of boundary colors with two hues. These hues are virtually constant as measured by chromaticity or CIELAB. We found seven cases of this kind using a new appearance model for boundary colors. The model correctly predicts that green and magenta bands recur as stripe widths and dispersion strength vary. The (...) first green/magenta case in the sequence traces out an accurate ellipse in XYZ color space. Green and magenta bands are prominent in supernumerary rainbows and interference rings, and we explain why that might be the case. The explanation is based on an interesting property of the visible spectrum. In addition to the green/magenta cases, the other cases are orange/cyan, yellowish-green/purple, and yellow/violet. The success of the boundary color appearance model implies that bands are perceived as if the wavelength responses of the cones were essentially independent, which contradicts the actual behavior of cones. (shrink)

According to one large family of views, scientific explanations explain a phenomenon (such as an event or a regularity) by subsuming it under a general representation, model, prototype, or schema (see Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36(2), 421–441; Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge: MIT Press; Darden (2006); Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of scientific (...) explanation. In C. G. Hempel (Ed.), Aspects of scientific explanation (pp. 331–496). New York: Free Press; Kitcher (1989); Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67(1), 1–25). My concern is with the minimal suggestion that an adequate philosophical theory of scientific explanation can limit its attention to the format or structure with which theories are represented. The representational subsumption view is a plausible hypothesis about the psychology of understanding. It is also a plausible claim about how scientists present their knowledge to the world. However, one cannot address the central questions for a philosophical theory of scientific explanation without turning one’s attention from the structure of representations to the basic commitments about the worldly structures that plausibly count as explanatory. A philosophical theory of scientific explanation should achieve two goals. The first is explanatory demarcation. It should show how explanation relates with other scientific achievements, such as control, description, measurement, prediction, and taxonomy. The second is explanatory normativity. It should say when putative explanations succeed and fail. One cannot achieve these goals without undertaking commitments about the kinds of ontic structures that plausibly count as explanatory. Representations convey explanatory information about a phenomenon when and only when they describe the ontic explanations for those phenomena. (shrink)

The world of entrepreneurship has historically been linked with taking risks and the potential for significant rewards. However, there persists a notable gender imbalance in the entrepreneurial landscape, wherein women entrepreneurs remain a minority. Women navigating the entrepreneurial path encounter distinct challenges, setting their experiences apart from their male counterparts. In Balayan, Batangas, despite strides towards gender equality, women entrepreneurs continue to face challenges in the entrepreneurial landscape. This qualitative study delves into the experiences of 10 successful female entrepreneurs who (...) met specific criteria. Accordingly, semi-structured interviews are conducted, exploring various aspects of participants' experiences and revealing their motivations, achievements, challenges, and strategies. Thematic analysis reveals the connection between familial, community-driven, and personal motivations that drive these entrepreneurs forward. Despite facing obstacles such as financial constraints and gender biases, they prioritize financial gains and personal growth. With resilience, innovation, and dedication, these women overcome challenges and achieve success, utilizing support networks and online marketing strategies to their advantage. Recommendations include empowering women in entrepreneurship, strengthening support networks, introducing tailored financial literacy programs, and advocating against gender biases. Implement skill development initiatives and provide specialized education in online marketing. Engage in policy advocacy, celebrate success stories, and continuously research challenges and successes. Foster collaborative partnerships between businesses, educational institutions, and communities, and advocate for increased funding opportunities for sustainable growth. This research emphasizes the strength and capabilities of women entrepreneurs in Balayan, Batangas, affirming that "pink doesn't mean weak.". (shrink)

Denne artikel hedder ”Musikalske Omgangsformer”. Men den fortæller ikke så meget om, hvorledes musikalske omgangsformer tager sig ud, som den fører til et punkt, hvor musikalske omgangsformer bliver sigtbare og påtrængende. Snarere end at præsentere en teori om musikalske omgangsformer anviser den et sted, hvor en teoridannelse er påkrævet. Udgangspunktet bliver en påvisning af, hvorledes den fænomenologiske tilgang til det musikalske fænomen svigter ved tematisk og dog stiltiende at hævde musikstykket, satsen, som sin genstand. Utilstrækkeligheden påpeges inden for den fænomenologiske (...) analyses eget univers. Som sådan vil den ved artiklens afslutning yderligere omfatte formuleringen af den påpegede utilstrækkelighed. Fra dette – negative – udgangspunkt tages skridtet ind i et rum, der skal indbefatte de påviste løse ender og samtidig give plads for, at vi med positivt udgangspunkt i en praxis-orienteret filosofi kan komme til at binde de nødvendige knuder. (shrink)

. In the philosophy of J. L. Schellenberg, “evolutionary religion” is a religious stance oriented towards the deep future. According to Schellenberg, the best form of evolutionary religion is non-doxastic faith in ultimism. I reject Schellenberg’s arguments for preferring ultimism and suggest that committing non-doxastically to traditional religion makes more sense from an evolutionary perspective. I argue that the alignment argument for traditional religion remains sound even when the deep future is considered. Furthermore, I assess Schellenberg’s claim that humanity is (...) religiously immature. (shrink)

In Embracing Paradox, Evolving Language, L.E. Maroski proposes that humanity is poised on the cusp of a transformation of consciousness that requires not only a shift in values and perspectives, but also a shift in a basic technology we take for granted—language. Because we use language to create social structures and institutions, including education, governance, and our most intimate relationships, the structure of our language contributes to the way we structure those creations. Maroski questions the cultural assumptions that are built (...) into the structure of language—primarily English—and invites the reader to imagine and ultimately to help develop novel structures of language that arise from different assumptions. To do so, she shows how we can draw inspiration from paradoxical topological forms, such as the Möbius strip and Klein bottle, as they embody both unity and duality/multiplicity. By seeing our reality not simply in terms of either/or but also in terms of both (many)/and, perhaps our feelings of fragmentation and the stultifying oppositions that have polarized society can transform into appreciation for the wholeness of all existence. (shrink)

This essay explores the psychological freedom that emerges from the acceptance of death, arguing that it should not be seen as merely a one-sided freedom of death without the complementary freedom of life. While death is often met with dread and fear, it can foster a sense of authenticity and alignment with personal values. However, this realization must also emphasize the importance of life, as the goal of psychological well-being lies in living, not just acknowledging death. This balance allows us (...) to live fully, prioritize meaningful experiences, and discard trivial concerns. By drawing on Carl Sagan’s reflections on humanity’s insignificance within the cosmos, this essay encourages empowered and responsible living that embraces both life and death. (shrink)

This paper analyzes some grammatical aspects of the English verb "to mean" and its nominalizations, and based on that, argues that meaning is something that people do rather than something that words have.

(First paragraphs.) The idea that our language somehow influences our thought can be found in philosophical and scientific traditions of different continents and with different roots and objectives. Yet, beyond the mere theoretical, explorations of the idea are relatively scarce, and are mostly limited to relations between very concrete conceptual categories and subjective experiencing and remembering – to some kind of ‘psychologies of folk-ontology’. Thought as process, reasoning or ‘thinking’, and the role of more complex or abstract concepts in (such) (...) thought tend to be mostly ignored in psychology and philosophy. Conceptual and intellectual history, on the other hand, cannot be accused of such neglect, but the common lack of a comparative perspective in those fields precludes any generalized inference. Furthermore, while a comparative study on the role of complex or abstract concepts in thought as process and its products (the aggregate ‘thought’ of schools, ages, and regions) could result in a considerable enrichment of our understanding of the relationships between language and thought, it would not necessarily be recognized as such because of a fundamental difference in the nature of the concepts involved, affecting the boundary of ‘language’ in the pair ‘language and thought’. More concretely, while the concepts of the ‘psychologies of folk-ontology’ are rather concrete categories of ‘things’ or aspects of experienced reality (hence, ‘folk-ontology’), the abstract concepts of (comparative) conceptual history, such as ‘society’ or ‘reason’, are categories of ideas. Consequently, conceptual history is inseparably tied to the history of ideas, and there is no strict boundary line between concepts, theories, ideas, and aggregate thought in general. It could, therefore, be argued that a comparative conceptual history would be a study of the influence of ideas on thought, rather than of language on thought. That argument, however, would either void language of content, or make the dubious claim that folk-ontology is a fundamentally different type of content than theoretical content. The ‘psychologies of folk-ontology’ study the influence of folk-ontological categories on folk-ontological thought (experiencing and remembering), and a comparative conceptual history would study the influence of theoretical categories (or conceptualized ideas) on theoretical thought (thinking, reasoning, etc.), and there does not seem to be a good reason to exclude either type of categories from ‘language’. Perhaps it should be argued instead that the ambiguous term ‘language’ in the pair ‘language and thought’ would better be replaced with ‘concepts’ or ‘categories’. (shrink)

Seguendo l’esposizione data in (Orsi 2012), riguardante una comparazione fra alcuni aspetti dell’opera di Carl Schmitt e di Jürgen Habermas in filosofia politica, centrata sulla nozione di ordine ed inquadrata, nelle sue basi, entro la sociologia delle religioni di Max Weber, sarà possibile, oltre l’individuazione in essa di un comune punto di convergenza fra il pensiero dei questi autori nella nozione di ordine, portare avanti, su un piano teoretico di livello superiore, un ulteriore raffronto più orientato verso la metodologia (...) della ricerca filosofica così come intesa da Martin Heidegger, la quale permetterà tra l’altro di vedere sia Schmitt che Habermas da un altro possibile punto di vista prospettico. (shrink)

Many nineteenth-century psychologists assume that the measurement of psychic intensity is a prerequisite to the development of a truly scientific psychology. In the first edition of the Psychology from an empirical point of view, Brentano deals with this question. He assumes that all psychic phenomena admit of a certain intensity. Later on, Brentano retreats this doctrine and claims that only sensible phenomena admit of an intensity, whereas intellectual presentations do not. As a consequence, Brentano introduces a radical gap between sensible (...) and noetic consciousness. By contrast, Stumpf maintains a continuity between sensations and presentations. The main difference between them is the degree of their intensity. The essay provides a discussion and a comparison of the above mentioned points of view. (shrink)

Discussione a partire dal libro di Giorgio Agamben "Karman. Breve trattato sull'azione, la colpa e il gesto", Bollati Boringhieri, 2017.

PRINCÍPIOS DA DIGESTÃO DOS ALIMENTOS NOS BEZERROS -/- -/- E. I. C. da Silva -/- Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim -/- Departamento de Zootecnia – UFRPE sede -/- -/- PRINCÍPIOS DA DIGESTÃO DOS ALIMENTOS NOS BEZERROS -/- -/- INTRODUÇÃO -/- Se todos os bezerros pudessem ser criados por suas mães, haveria pouca necessidade de inúmeros livros, artigos e trabalhos, como esse, sobre a criação e o manejo básico desses animais. A maioria das vacas desempenha um ótimo papel (...) na criação dos seus descendentes, desde que sejam tomados os devidos cuidados com relação a alimentação, saúde e a outros aspectos relativos à criação desses neonatos. A essência da pecuária bovina relativa à criação de bezerros é manter esses animais vivos e aptos o suficiente para desempenhar atividades produtivas de grande importância na propriedade. Para tanto, os criadores necessitam entender o desenvolvimento do trato digestivo do bezerro e os conceitos básicos da digestão dos alimentos por ele, e é isso que pretendo aclarar de forma clara e concisa com esse trabalho. -/- -/- 1.1 O TRATO DIGESTIVO DO BEZERRO -/- Um animal adulto necessita de quatro estômagos funcionais para dar-lhe a capacidade de utilizar a ampla gama de alimentos disponíveis. -/- O retículo e o rúmen abrigam milhões de micróbios que fermentam e digerem o material vegetal, em especial às presentes nas forragens. O omaso permite a absorção de água do conteúdo do intestino. O abomaso, ou quarto estômago, é o verdadeiro estômago, comparável ao dos humanos, e permite a digestão ácida dos alimentos. -/- O bezerro muito jovem não desenvolve a capacidade de digerir o pasto, sendo assim o abomaso é o único estômago funcional ao nascer. Tanto os animais recém-nascidos como os adultos têm um intestino delgado funcional que permite a digestão alcalina dos alimentos. -/- A figura 1 ilustra a anatomia dos estômagos e intestino delgado de um bezerro recém-nascido. Esse diagrama esquemático mostra as dimensões relativas dos quatro estômagos, o sulco esofágico, que vai do esôfago até o abomaso, e o esfíncter pilórico ou válvula no fundo do abomaso, que controla a velocidade de movimento do conteúdo do intestino no duodeno. -/- O omaso e o abomaso representam cerca de 70% da capacidade total do estômago no bezerro recém-nascido. Por outro lado, nas vacas adultas, eles compõem apenas 30% da capacidade total do estômago (figura 2). -/- A digestão dos alimentos é auxiliada pela secreção de certos produtos químicos denominados enzimas, que estão presentes nas várias partes do intestino. Por exemplo, os bezerros produzem a enzima renina na parede do abomasal para auxiliar na digestão das proteínas do leite, enquanto a lactase é produzida na parede do duodeno para a digestão do açúcar do leite (lactose). Estas enzimas operam mais eficazmente em diferentes níveis de acidez no conteúdo do intestino, ácido no abomaso e alcalino no duodeno. Para conseguir isso, o bezerro segrega eletrólitos, ou sais minerais, com as enzimas, para mudar o conteúdo do intestino de um tipo para outro. -/- Os produtos finais da digestão dos diferentes componentes dos alimentos são absorvidos através da parede do intestino, mediante as vilosidades intestinais, para a corrente sanguínea, onde são levados para as diferentes partes do corpo para o crescimento e desenvolvimento do animal. -/- -/- 1.2 O BEZERRO ALIMENTADO COM LEITE -/- O Leite ou substituto do leite, quer seja apreendido através de uma teta ou bebido de um balde, é canalizado do esôfago através do sulco esofágico para o abomaso. Este sulco é um pequeno canal na parede do rúmen que é controlado por músculos que permitem que os líquidos sejam diretamente enviados para o abomaso e que não entrem no rúmen. O sulco é ativado em resposta a diferentes estímulos. Funciona bem quando os bezerros amamentam-se através das tetas das mães, mas às vezes não funciona quando bebem de um balde. Essa parece ser uma condição psicológica em resposta aos bezerros separados de suas mães. A maioria dos bezerros podem ser treinados pelo tratador para beber o leite do balde rapidamente e bem, a metodologia empregada é a da persuasão do animal, ao qual o mesmo possa responder positivamente à nova rotina diária e à mãe substituta na forma do criador do bezerro. Quando o leite ou o substituto do leite entra no abomaso, forma um coágulo firme dentro de alguns minutos sob a influência das enzimas renina e pepsina. Este é o mesmo processo envolvido na fabricação de queijo ou junket, usando renina para coagular a proteína do leite. A coagulação do leite retarda a taxa em que flui para fora do abomaso, permitindo assim uma liberação constante de nutrientes alimentares em todo o intestino e, eventualmente, para a corrente sanguínea. Pode levar de 12 a 18 horas para que a coalhada de leite seja totalmente digerida. -/- As enzimas que atuam nas proteínas do leite requerem um ambiente ácido e esse é fornecido pela secreção do ácido clorídrico no abomaso. No entanto, até que a digestão ácida esteja operando de forma eficiente, e isso pode levar até sete dias, a única forma de proteína que pode ser digerida é a caseína. Não há substituto para a caseína no bezerro muito jovem. Os substitutos do leite que contêm outras formas de proteína não podem ser devidamente digeridos até que os bezerros sejam mais velhos. Logo, é necessário muito cuidado para não fornecer substitutos ou sucedâneos que contenham fontes proteicas que não possam ser digeridas pelo estômago do animal, para que não ocasione complicações gastrintestinais. -/- A digestão do leite pode ser melhorada com a inclusão de coalho, que pode ser obtido a partir de fábricas de queijo ou aditivos comerciais de leite de bezerro para a primeira semana ou mais. Esses produtos comerciais podem fornecer ácidos adicionais para reduzir o pH abomasal e incrementar a quantidade de enzimas e bactérias específicas para aumentar a taxa de degradação da coalhada de leite. Tais aditivos são chamados probióticos, na medida em que ajudam nos processos digestivos normais. A pesquisa nem sempre os encontrou para melhorar o desempenho e a saúde dos bezerros, e eles são mais propensos a ser benéficos quando os bezerros estão sofrendo de problemas de saúde. Além disso, a sua eficácia, em termos de custo-benefício é, por vezes, questionada. -/- Qualquer leite de uma alimentação anterior está envolvido neste coágulo recém-formado. As proteínas líquidas de soro de leite e a lactose são rapidamente separadas da coalhada de leite e passam para o abomaso. A gordura do leite contida na coalhada de leite é decomposta por outra enzima, a lipase. Esta é secretado na boca pela saliva e incorporada quando o leite é engolido. A alimentação pelas tetas em vez da alimentação através do balde parece produzir mais saliva e, portanto, mais lipase. A digestão adicional da proteína do leite e da gordura ocorre no duodeno com a ajuda das enzimas produzidas no pâncreas. -/- A lactose, que é rapidamente liberada da coalhada de leite no abomaso, é dividida em glicose e galactose e estas são absorvidas na corrente sanguínea para formar a principal fonte de energia para os bezerros jovens. -/- As gorduras são divididas em ácidos graxos e glicerol para absorção e uso como energia, enquanto as proteínas são divididas em aminoácidos e peptídeos para absorção e uso como fontes de proteína corporal. -/- O amido de cereais, por exemplo, é uma importante fonte de energia em bezerros mais velhos, mas esses animais, nas suas primeiras semanas de vida, não conseguem digerir o amido. -/- O abomaso não é ácido até que o bezerro tenha 1-2 dias de idade e isso apresenta vantagens e desvantagens. A principal vantagem é que as proteínas imunes no colostro não podem ser digeridas nesse compartimento estomacal, por isso são absorvidas na corrente sanguínea na mesma forma quando produzidas pela vaca. Isso garante o seu papel como anticorpos para proteger contra as doenças e infecções. A baixa acidez do conteúdo abomasal no bezerro recém-nascido constitui um risco potencial das bactérias (e provavelmente vírus) tomadas através da boca. Estes não serão mortos pela digestão ácida, sendo assim podem passar para os intestinos, onde podem fazer mal ao bezerro recém-nascido. -/- Todos os bezerros pegam bactérias nos primeiros dias de vida e isso é essencial para o desenvolvimento normal do rúmen (flora microbiana). No entanto, a primeira bactéria a colonizar o intestino também pode causar danos. Desde que o bezerro tenha bebido colostro, os anticorpos maternos podem controlar a propagação dessas bactérias mais nocivas. -/- O bezerro alimentado com leite deve, então, produzir uma digestão ácida no abomaso e uma digestão alcalina no duodeno. Isto é conseguido pela produção de eletrólitos na parede do intestino. -/- Bezerros que sofrem de escoriações devido a distúrbios nutricionais ou infecções bacterianas podem perder grandes quantidades de água e eletrólitos em suas fezes. Estes devem ser reabastecidos como parte do tratamento para as escoriações. -/- O colostro é o primeiro leite produzido por vacas recém-paridas. Além de fornecer nutrientes essenciais para a alimentação animal, fornece anticorpos maternos que permitem a transferência passiva de imunidade contra doenças. As recomendações para a alimentação com colostro serão abordadas brevemente em outro trabalho. -/- -/- 1.3 DESENVOLVIMENTO DO RÚMEN E O PROCESSO DE DESMAME -/- Quando os bezerros são desmamados, o custo da criação diminui acentuadamente. Os custos de alimentação são mais baixos, os insumos de trabalho são reduzidos e a incidência de problemas de saúde é menor. No sentido econômico, faz sentido desmamar os bezerros assim que for razoável. No entanto, o bezerro é forçado a sofrer várias mudanças dramáticas, a saber: -/-  A fonte primária de nutrientes muda de líquido para sólido. -/-  A quantidade de matéria seca que o bezerro recebe é reduzida. -/-  O bezerro deve adaptar-se de um tipo monogástrico a um ruminante de digestão, que inclui a fermentação de alimentos. -/-  Mudanças na habitação e no manejo muitas vezes ocorrem em torno do desmame, o que pode aumentar o estresse. -/- Ao nascer, o rúmen é uma parte pequena e estéril do intestino que, ao desmame deve se tornar o compartimento mais importante dos quatro estômagos. Deve aumentar em tamanho, atividade metabólica interna e fluxo sanguíneo externo. Os cinco requisitos para o desenvolvimento ruminal são: -/-  Estabelecimento de bactérias. -/-  Líquido. -/-  Saída de material (ação muscular). -/-  Capacidade absortiva do tecido. -/-  Substrato para permitir o crescimento bacteriano, tais como minerais reciclados, bem como nutrientes para alimentação. -/- Antes do consumo de alimentos sólidos, as bactérias existentes fermentam o cabelo ingerido, o estrato e o leite que flui do abomaso para o rúmen. A maior parte da água que entra no rúmen provém da água livre (água real não contida no leite ou na solução substituta do leite). O leite contornará o rúmen através do sulco esofágico, enquanto a água livre não. -/- O rúmen se desenvolve a partir de um órgão muito pequeno em bezerros recém-nascidos (1-2 L) para a parte mais importante do intestino (25-30 L) por 3 meses de idade. Ele pode aumentar muito rapidamente durante as primeiras semanas de vida, dado o manejo da alimentação direita. -/- O crescimento do rúmen ocorre apenas sob a influência dos produtos finais da digestão no mesmo, que resultam da fermentação de alimentos sólidos pelos micróbios presentes nesse compartimento. O desenvolvimento ocorre em grande parte através do crescimento das papilas ruminais (figura 5 e 6) na parede ruminal (estruturas semelhantes a folhas na superfície interna), que aumentam a área superficial do rúmen e, portanto, a sua capacidade de absorver estes produtos finais de digestão. Portanto, os concentrados favorecem melhor o desenvolvimento dessas papilas ruminais. Para tanto, é necessário, com um tempo, ir incrementando a dieta sólida gradativamente para que esses animais deixem de consumir o leite das vacas produtoras e possam alimentar-se de ração e pastagens, que é a finalidade da criação de bovinos, ou seja, criar animais com menor custo possível e engordá-los através de ração, mas principalmente de pastagens. -/- A capacidade do rúmen e a ingestão de alimentos sólidos estão intimamente relacionadas. O desenvolvimento do rúmen é muito lento em bezerros alimentados com grandes quantidades de leite. O leite satisfaz seus apetites para que eles não tenham fome suficiente para comer qualquer alimento sólido. Logo, é necessário diminuir paulatinamente o fornecedor do leite para esses animais, favorecendo a ingestão de alimentos sólidos e desenvolvendo o rúmen, estômago que digere as fibras das forragens e que os tona animais peculiares. -/- A ruminação pode ocorrer com cerca de 2 semanas de idade e é uma boa indicação de que o rúmen está se desenvolvendo. Alimentos sólidos, bem como a ruminação, estimulam a produção de saliva e isso fornece nutrientes como ureia e bicarbonato de sódio para produzir os substratos para o crescimento e desenvolvimento da flora bacteriana. -/- No desmame precoce, é importante limitar a quantidade de leite oferecida e a sua disponibilidade durante todo o dia. Também é essencial fornecer alimentos sólidos. Os grosseiros (de baixa ou alta qualidade) devem ser oferecidos em combinação com concentrados de alta qualidade. -/- O criador deve tomar cuidado com o fornecimento de alimentos como a ração farelada, uma vez que essa ração pode entrar pelas vias nasais e ocasionar complicações respiratórias; há alguns relatos de bezerros mortos após a ingestão de ração farelada, na autópsia de um dos casos foi diagnosticada uma morte por esses grãos farelados presentes no pulmão. Portanto, para evitar complicações o ideal é que se forneça uma ração denominada peletizada. -/- Os alimentos grosseiros (volumosos) estimulam o desenvolvimento do rúmen, enquanto os concentrados fornecem nutrientes para a alimentação animal que não são fornecidos pelas quantidades limitadas de leite oferecidas. Sem os concentrados, o crescimento dos bezerros é lento, mas o rúmen ainda se desenvolve, resultando em animais barrigudos. -/- A ureia fornece nitrogênio para os micróbios, enquanto o bicarbonato de sódio atua como um tampão ruminal, ajudando a manter um pH estável no conteúdo do rúmen. Isso é, particularmente, importante quando os bezerros comem grandes quantidades de grãos de cereais na vida adulta, pois os micróbios do rúmen podem produzir muito ácido lático durante a fermentação desse material. -/- Envenenamento por grãos ou acidose ocorre quando os níveis de ácido lático são excessivamente elevados e tornam-se tóxicos para os micróbios do rúmen e, eventualmente, para o animal. Assim como os produtos finais que são absorvidos através da parede do rúmen, a fermentação microbiana produz os gases dióxido de carbono e metano e estes são normalmente exalados. Quando algo impede a fuga destes gases do rúmen, o inchaço pode se manifestar em qualquer fase da vida, diz-se do animal estufado. -/- -/- 1.4 O PAPEL DA FORRAGEM NO PROCESSO DE DESMAME -/- Existem inúmeras controvérsias acerca do papel da forragem no processo de desmame. Pesquisas realizadas na década de 1980 indicaram claramente que a forragem era benéfica, enquanto pesquisas da década de 1990 descobriram que nem sempre era necessário o fornecimento da forragem para que os bezerros fossem desmamados e que não sofresse estresse e nem apresentasse baixa eficiência produtiva e reprodutiva no futuro. Na maioria das pesquisas anteriores, os bezerros eram desmamados com a oferta de concentrados moídos como pellets com ou sem a presença de feno longo ou palha. Porém, a inclusão de forragens na dieta melhorou a ingestão e o desempenho, além de permitir o desmame precoce. -/- Na pesquisa posterior, os bezerros geralmente alimentavam-se de concentrados grosseiramente moídos, além de alguns volumosos, enquanto alguns até incluíam volumosos picados finos na mistura (às vezes chamados de mistura muesli por apresentar o capim e a ração). Nesses estudos, verificou-se que a inclusão de feno ou palha adicional teve pouco efeito no desempenho pré-desmame. -/- Os sistemas de criação de bezerros australianos frequentemente diferem dos demais, especialmente em áreas de parto sazonais. Um número excessivo elevado de bezerros precisam ser criados de uma só vez para lhes fornecer, a todos, currais individuais durante todo o seu período de amamentação. Consequentemente, os bezerros são criados em grupos. Além disso, os ingredientes da maioria dos concentrados para esses animais são finamente moídos. Nessas situações, descobriu-se que a palha limpa é um alimento útil e que deve ser incluso no período pré-desmame. Alguns agricultores preferem feno de boa qualidade, porém estes agricultores geralmente têm bezerros em grupos muito pequenos, muitas vezes um ou dois, por isso possuem maior controle sobre a ingestão de forragem. -/- Figura 7: A alimentação volumosa de bezerros alimentados com leite é uma questão controversa. Imagem cedida pelo IPA -/- É difícil e, portanto, mais caro que os produtores de rações incorporem feno picado nas refeições dos bezerros. Os pellets são muito mais fáceis, pois eles vão fluir para silos. Por fim, os produtores de leite devem incluir o componente volumoso no regime alimentar pré-desmame. A pastagem não é a fonte ideal de forragem volumosa para os bezerros alimentados com leite, uma vez que possui muito pouca fibra e uma baixa densidade de energia alimentar. O seu elevado teor de água limita a sua capacidade de fornecer energia alimentar adequada aos animais em crescimento. Para ingerir a pastagem a capacidade ruminal deveria ser maior, bezerros jovens simplesmente não conseguem comer pasto suficiente, a menos que seja de alta em qualidade. -/- Os bezerros criados com leite e fornecimento gradual de concentrados apresentam uma boa função ruminal às 3 semanas de vida, além de possuírem uma suficiente capacidade ruminal para o desmame entre às 4-6 semanas de idade. No entanto, se a dieta for baseada em leite restrito e pastagem de alta qualidade, a capacidade do rúmen pode não ser suficiente para o desmame até às 8-10 semanas de vida. Mesmo assim, as taxas de crescimento seriam menores em bezerros desmamados com base alimentar somente à pasto, uma vez que a ingestão de energia é insuficiente devido às limitações físicas da capacidade ruminal. -/- Se a qualidade for muito boa e produza apetite, os bezerros preferem volumosos ao invés do concentrado, o que leva a uma ingestão reduzida de nutrientes durante alimentação, tendo como efeito um crescimento mais lento. Quando volumosos e concentrados fornecem apetite no animal, juntamente com o leite limitado, os bezerros podem comer cerca de 10% de palha e 90% de concentrados. Sem o volumoso e a ruminação resultante, o desenvolvimento do rúmen será mais lento devido à falta de saliva e produtos finais da digestão de fibras presentes na parede celular das forragens. -/- -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- -/- BEN ASHER, Aharon. Manual de cría de becerras. Zaragoza: Acribia, 1999. -/- BITTAR, Carla Maris Machado; PORTAL, Rafaela Nunes Sanchez; PEREIRA, Anna Carolina Fett da Cunha. Criação de bezerras leiteiras. Piracicaba: EDUSP, 2018. -/- BLUM, J. W. Nutritional physiology of neonatal calves. Journal of animal physiology and animal nutrition, v. 90, n. 1‐2, p. 1-11, 2006. -/- CAMPOS, OF de. Criação de bezerros até a desmama. Coronel Pacheco: EMBRAPA/CNPGL, 1985. -/- COELHO, S. G. Criação de bezerros. II Simpósio Mineiro de Buiatria, Anais., Belo Horizonte, 2005. -/- DAVIS, Carl L. et al. The development, nutrition, and management of the young calf. Iowa State University Press, 1998. -/- DE OLIVEIRA, Juliana Silva; DE MOURA ZANINE, Anderson; SANTOS, Edson Mauro. Fisiologia, manejo e alimentação de bezerros de corte. Arquivos de Ciências Veterinárias e Zoologia da UNIPAR, v. 10, n. 1, 2007. -/- DRACKLEY, James K. Calf nutrition from birth to breeding. Veterinary Clinics of North America: Food Animal Practice, v. 24, n. 1, p. 55-86, 2008. -/- FERREIRA, Lucas Silveira et al. Desempenho animal e desenvolvimento do rúmen de bezerros leiteiros aleitados com leite integral ou sucedâneo. Boletim de Indústria Animal, v. 65, n. 4, p. 337-345, 2008. -/- GUILLOTEAU, P.; ZABIELSKI, R.; BLUM, J. W. Gastrointestinal tract and digestion in the young ruminant: ontogenesis, adaptations, consequences and manipulations. J Physiol Pharmacol, v. 60, n. Suppl 1, p. 37-46, 2009. -/- HUBER, J. T. Development of the digestive and metabolic apparatus of the calf. Journal of Dairy Science, v. 52, n. 8, p. 1303-1315, 1969. -/- LONGENBACH, J. I.; HEINRICHS, Arlyn Judson. A review of the importance and physiological role of curd formation in the abomasum of young calves. Animal feed science and technology, v. 73, n. 1-2, p. 85-97, 1998. -/- LOPES, Marcos Aurélio; VIEIRA, P. de F. Criação de bezerros leiteiros. Jaboticabal: Funep, 1998. -/- LUCCI, Carlos de Sousa. Bovinos leiteiros jovens: nutrição, manejo, doenças. São Paulo: Nobel, 1989. -/- ROY, James Henry Barstow et al. The calf. Boston: Butterworths., 1980. -/- SAVAGE, E. S.; MCCAY, C. M. The nutrition of calves; A review. Journal of Dairy Science, v. 25, n. 7, p. 595-650, 1942. -/- THIVEND, P.; TOULLEC, R.; GUILLOTEAU, P. Digestive adaptation in the preruminant. In: Digestive physiology and metabolism in ruminants. Springer, Dordrecht, 1980. p. 561-585. (shrink)

Reedition of papers in English spanning from 1986 to 2009 /// Historical background -- An imposed legacy -- Twentieth century contemporaneity -- Appendix: The philosophy of teaching legal philosophy in Hungary /// HISTORICAL BACKGROUND -- PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE: A SKETCH OF HISTORY [1999] 11–21 // PHILOSOPHISING ON LAW IN THE TURMOIL OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN HUNGARY (TWO PORTRAITS, INTERWAR AND POSTWAR: JULIUS MOÓR & ISTVÁN LOSONCZY) [2001–2002] 23–39: Julius Moór 23 / István Losonczy 29 // (...) ON THE SURVIVAL OF ILMAR TAMMELO’S LETTER AND MANUSCRIPT ADDRESSED TO PROFESSOR MOÓR [2009] 41–44 // PROFESSIONAL DISTRESS AND SCARCITY: ALEXANDER HORVÁTH AND THE LEGACY OF NATURAL LAW IN HUNGARY [2005] 45–50 // HUNGARIAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE 20TH CENTURY [2011] 51–72: I. The Pre-war Period [1. Bódog (Felix) Somló (1871–1920) 52] / II. The Inter-war Period [2. Gyula (Julius) Moór (1888–1950) 54 / 3. Barna Horváth (1896–1973) 55 / 4. József Szabó (1909–1992) 57 / 5. István Bibó (1911–1979) 58 / 6. Tibor Vas (1911–1983) 59 / 7. István Losonczy (1918–1980) 60] III. The Post-war Period (Communism) 61 [8. Imre Szabó (1912–1991) 62 / 9. Vilmos Peschka (1929–2006) 63 / 10. Kálmán Kulcsár (1928–2010) 65] IV. Contemporary Trends and Perspectives 66 [11. Csaba Varga (b. 1941) 66 / 12. András Sajó (b. 1949) 69 / 13. Béla Pokol (b. 1950) 70] V. Our Understanding of the Law Today 71 --- AN IMPOSED LEGACY -- LOOKING BACK [1999] 75–94: 1. On Ideologies and Marxism in general 75 / 2. Life of an Intellectual in Communism 79 / 3. On Marxism and its Socialist Cultivation in Particular 82 / 4. Legal Philosophising [4.1. Approaches to Law 87 / 4.2. Arriving at a Legal Ontology 91] 5. Conclusion 94 // LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MARXISM OF SOCIALISM: HUNGARIAN OVERVIEW IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE [2003] 95–151: I. Development and Balance of Marxist Philosophising on Law in Hungary [1. Preliminaries (until 1948) 96 / 2. Stalinism (from the Soviet Occupation on) {a) Liquidation of the »Residues« 98 / b) Soviet-type Uniformisation [Gleichschaltung] 99 / c) Denial of the Past, with a Dual Effect 99 / d) »Socialist Legality«, Drawn from the Progressive Past of Western Europe 103 / e) Search for the Germs of Scholarly Evolution 103} 3. Institutionalisation Accompanied by Relaxation (from the 1960s) [a) Epigonism Becoming the Scholarly Ideal 104 / b) Stalinism in a Critical Self-perspective 105 / c) Disciples Diversified Launching their own Trends 107 / d) Comparatism 110 / e) (Re)discovery of the Western Legal Philosophy as a Competitor 112 / f) A Leading Mediatory Role within the »Socialist World Order« 114} 4. Disintegration (in the 1980s) {a) Attempt at Laying New Foundations for Marxism with Epigonism Exhausted 115 / b) Competitive Trends Becoming Exclusive 115 / c) Western Legal Philosophy Acknowledged as a Fellow-traveller within the Socialist Orbit Proper 116 / d) Hungarian Legal Theory Transforming into a National Corpus 118 / e) The Practical Promotion of Some Balance 119} 5. End-game for a Substitute State Religion (in the 1990s) 120] II. Marxist Legal Philosophising in an International Perspective [Ad 1: To the Preliminaries 122 / Ad 2: To Stalinism 124 / Ad 3: To Institutionalisation Accompanied by Relaxation {a) Late Separation from Vishinskiy’s Theory 125 / b) From Ideological Self-closure to an Apparently Scholarly Openness 127 / c) From Political Ideology to Genuine Scholarship 130 / d) International Recognition of Socialist Jurisprudence as an Independent Trend 135 / e) Together with Western Trends 137} Ad 4: To Disintegration {a) Loss of Attraction as Mere Epigonism 139 / b) Exclusivity of Competing Trends 139 / c) Fellowship with »Bourgeois« Trends 140 / d) An own Trend, Internationally Recognised 141 / e) A yet Progressive Role 142} Ad 5: To the Present state 143] III. A Temporary Balance 145 // AUTONOMY AND INSTRUMENTALITY OF LAW IN A SUPERSTRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE [1986] 151–175: 1. The Strange Fate of Concepts 151 / I. A Relational Category 2. Basis and Superstructure: The Genuine Meaning 154 / 3. Exerting Social Influence as a Conceptual Minimum 156 / 4. Relationships within the Prevailing Totality 158 / 5. Attempts at Interpretation in Hungary 159 / 6. The Lukácsian Stand 162 / 7. Lukács’s Recognitions 168 / 8. Some Criticism 169 / II. The Law’s Understanding 171 / 9. Law Interpreted as Superstructure 171 / 10. Conclusions Drawn for the Law’s Understanding 173 // LEGAL THEORY IN TRANSITION (A PREFACE FROM HUNGARY) [2000] 177–186 // DEVELOPMENT OF THEORETICAL LEGAL THOUGHT IN HUNGARY AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM [2006] 187–215: 1. International Environment 188 / 2. The Situation in Hungary 190 / 3. Outlook I: The Historical-comparative Study of Legal Cultures and of the Lawyerly Way of Thinking 203 / 4. Outlook II: The Paradigmatic Enigma of the Transition to Rule of Law 207 / 5. Incongruity in Practice 213 / 6. Perspectives 214 --- TWENTIETH CENTURY CONTEMPORANEITY -- CHANGE OF PARADIGMS IN LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION: CARL SCHMITT AND THE TEMPTATION TO FINALLY REACH A SYNTHESIS [2002] 219–234: 1. Dangers of Intellectualism 219 / 2. Schmitt in Facts 221 / 3. Schmitt and Kelsen 222 / 4. On Bordering Conditions 226 / 5. With Kelsen in Transubstantiation 230 / 6. Polarisation as the Path of Theoretical Development 232 // KELSENIAN DOCUMENTS IN HUNGARY: CHAPTERS ON CONTACTS, INCLUDING THE GENESIS OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY [2006] 235–243: 1. Preludes 235 / 2. The Search for Moór’s Bequeath 235 / 3. Moór’s Collegiality 238 / 4. Bibó as a Disciple Translating 241 // THE »HART-PHENOMENON« [2002] 245–267: I. The Hart-miracle 246 [1. The Scene of Britain at the Time 247 / 2. The Personal Career 250 / 3. The Opus’ Career 252 / 4. Verbal Sociologism 255 / 5. Growing into the British Pattern 259] II. The Hart-phenomenon 260 [6. Origination of a Strange Orthodoxy 261 / 7. Mastering Periods of the 20th Century 263 / 8. Raising the Issue of Reception in Hungary 365] // LITERATURE? A SUBSTITUTE FOR LEGAL PHILOSOPHY? [2007] 269–287: 1. The Enigma of Law and its Study 269 / 2. “Law and Literature” 271 / 3. Varieties of “Law and Literature” 274 / 4. The German Study of Artistic Representations 280 / 5. Some Literary Reconsiderations 285 / 6. Conclusion 287 --- APPENDIX -- THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN HUNGARY [2007] 291–320: I. Why and How to Philosophise in Law? 291 / II. The State of Teaching Legal Philosophy 294 / III. The Philosophy of Teaching Legal Philosophy 296 / IV. Programme at the Catholic University of Hungary 300 [1. Graduate Studies 300 {a) Basic Subjects 301 / b) Facultative Seminars 305 / c) Closing Subjects 309 / d) Written Memoranda and the Thesis 312} 2. Postgraduate Studies 313 / 3. Conclusion 317] V. Perspectives 318 /// Index of Subjects 321 / Index of Normative Materials 328 / Index of Names 329 . (shrink)

Au-delà de l’intérêt purement historiographique, nous tentons ici de dégager l’intérêt proprement philosophique de thèses fondamentales du philosophe Carl Stumpf : l’appel à une méthode intuitionniste, c’est-à-dire au retour à ce qui est effectivement donné ; le principe fondamental de l’autonomie de la sphère du sensible ou (dans la terminologie husserlienne) du domaine hylétique, c’est-à-dire son indépendance vis-à-vis des activités noétiques ; le dégagement d’un concept non purement empiriste et non atomiste de la sensibilité ; le principe anti-associationniste et (...) anti-kantien qui est inhérent à la méthode d’analyse des parties psychologiques (psychologische Theile) ou de contenus partiels (Theilinhalte) ; enfin, la désubjectivation de l’a priori, qui s’oppose de manière radicale à la conception kantienne de l’a priori qui l’identifie à l’élément formel de la connaissance, c’est-à-dire à une forme subjective. Et nous tentons de mettre en évidence mettre en évidence la manière dont ces principes œuvrent déjà au sein de l’analyse de l’origine de la représentation de l’espace, telle qu’elle se présente dans l’ouvrage de 1874 “Sur l’origine psychologique de la représentation de l’espace”. (shrink)

Introduction to the special issue in Pragmatics & Cognition focused on creativity, cognition, and material culture. With contributions from Maurice Bloch, Chris Gosden, Tim Ingold, John Kirsh, Carl Knappett & Sander van der Leeuw, Lambros Malafouris, Frédéric Vallée-Tourangeau, Kevin Warwick, and Tom Wynn and Frederick L. Coolidge.

Karl Popper, en tant que rationaliste critique, a été un opposant à toutes les formes de scepticisme, de conventionnalisme et de relativisme scientifique. En 1935, il a écrit Logik der Forschung. Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft, traduisant plus tard le livre en anglais et le publiant sous le titre The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), considéré comme un travail de pionnier dans son domaine. De nombreux arguments de ce livre sont dirigés contre les membres du « Cercle de Vienne », (...) tels que Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, Rudolph Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, Carl Hempel et Herbert Feigl. Popper est d'accord avec eux sur les aspects généraux de la méthodologie scientifique et sur leur méfiance à l'égard de la méthodologie philosophique traditionnelle, mais ses solutions ont été sensiblement différentes. Popper a largement contribué aux débats sur la méthodologie scientifique générale, la démarcation de la pseudo-science, la nature des probabilités et la méthodologie des sciences sociales. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.12087.57763. (shrink)

Julien Freund's political theory, particularly known for his 1965 opus magnum "L'essence du politique", rests on epistemological and philosophical foundations that he himself condensed into his "theory of essence." Although he first applied this theoretical model to politics, he conceived it as a tool for the global analysis of social phenomena from an onto-phenomenological and, in this same sense, anthropological perspective. However, there has not yet been a complete exposition of this theory, to which we now aim to dedicate a (...) first systematic study, focusing especially on two problems: the historical context in which the theory was forged and its general epistemological intent, which can only be adequately understood in its original metaphysical significance. (shrink)

Demokrasinin alışılagelen ve hatta belki de klişe tanımı “halkın egemenliği” şeklindedir. Buna göre demokrasilerde halkın kendi kendisini yönettiği söylenir. Gelgelelim kavramların da tarihi vardır ve tarihselliğinden yalıtılan kavramların mutlaklaştırılması ve böylece kavramlara ilişkin meselelerde totaliter tarzda yaklaşımların peyda olması kaçınılmazdır. O halde demokrasinin “kendinden menkul” olmadığını bilmek, onun tarihselliğini kavramakla mümkündür. Bu kavrayış, yönsüzleşmiş bir demokrasinin doğurduğu sorunları bertaraf etmenin sağlam bir yoludur. Demokrasinin nasıl olup da yönsüzleşebileceği, yani halkın egemenliğinin halka karşı yönelebileceği de yine bu yolla anlaşılabilir.

The standard version of sufficientarianism maintains that providing people with enough, or as close to enough as is possible, is lexically prior to other distributive goals. This article argues that this is excessive – more than distributive justice allows – in four distinct ways. These concern the magnitude of advantage, the number of beneficiaries, responsibility and desert, and above-threshold distribution. Sufficientarians can respond by accepting that providing enough unconditionally is more than distributive justice allows, instead balancing sufficiency against other considerations.

The method of reflective equilibrium focuses on the relationship between principles and judgments. Principles are relatively general rules for comprehending the area of enquiry. Judgments are our intuitions or commitments, ‘at all levels of generality’ (Rawls 1975: 8), regarding the subject matter. The basic idea of reflective equilibrium is to bring principles and judgments into accord. This can be achieved by revising the principles and/or the judgments. -/- I first look at normative political judgments (Section 2) before considering the role (...) of principles, arguments, devices of representation and background theory in wide reflective equilibrium (Section 3). I then consider two of the main challenges to the method (Section 4), and show how to use it to deliberate about substantive political principles (Section 5). I conclude with an extended example of the method in action (Section 6). (shrink)

An adequate understanding of the ubiquitous practice of mechanistic explanation requires an account of what Craver termed “constitutive relevance.” Entities or activities are constitutively relevant to a phenomenon when they are parts of the mechanism responsible for that phenomenon. Craver’s mutual manipulability account extended Woodward’s account of manipulationist counterfactuals to analyze how interlevel experiments establish constitutive relevance. Critics of MM argue that applying Woodward’s account to this philosophical problem conflates causation and constitution, thus rendering the account incoherent. These criticisms, we (...) argue, arise from failing to distinguish the semantic, epistemic, and metaphysical aspects of the problem of constitutive relevance. In distinguishing these aspects of the problem and responding to these critics accordingly, we amend MM into a refined epistemic criterion, the “matched interlevel experiments” account. Further, we explain how this epistemological thesis is grounded in the plausible metaphysical thesis that constitutive relevance is causal betweenness. (shrink)

This paper continues the defense of a version of scientific realism, Tautological Scientific Realism, that rests on the claim that, excluding some areas of fundamental physics about which doubts are entirely justified, many areas of contemporary science cannot be coherently imagined to be false other than via postulation of radically skeptical scenarios, which are not relevant to the realism debate in philosophy of science. In this paper we discuss, specifically, the threats of meaning change and reference failure associated with the (...) Kuhnian tradition, which depend on a descriptivist approach to meaning, and we argue that descriptivism is not the right account of the meaning and reference of theoretical terms. We suggest that an account along the lines of the causal-historical theory of reference provides a more faithful picture of how terms for unobservable theoretical entities and properties come to refer; we argue that this picture works particularly well for TSR. In the last section we discuss how our account raises concerns specifically for perspectival forms of scientific realism. (shrink)

Longtermists have argued that humanity should significantly increase its efforts to prevent catastrophes like nuclear wars, pandemics, and AI disasters. But one prominent longtermist argument overshoots this conclusion: the argument also implies that humanity should reduce the risk of existential catastrophe even at extreme cost to the present generation. This overshoot means that democratic governments cannot use the longtermist argument to guide their catastrophe policy. In this paper, we show that the case for preventing catastrophe does not depend on longtermism. (...) Standard cost-benefit analysis implies that governments should spend much more on reducing catastrophic risk. We argue that a government catastrophe policy guided by cost-benefit analysis should be the goal of longtermists in the political sphere. This policy would be democratically acceptable, and it would reduce existential risk by almost as much as a strong longtermist policy. (shrink)

In “What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?” (2013b), Lange uses several compelling examples to argue that certain explanations for natural phenomena appeal primarily to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In such explanations, the core explanatory facts are modally stronger than facts about causation, regularity, and other natural relations. We show that Lange's account of distinctively mathematical explanation is flawed in that it fails to account for the implicit directionality in each of his examples. This inadequacy is remediable in each (...) case by appeal to ontic facts that account for why the explanation is acceptable in one direction and unacceptable in the other direction. The mathematics involved in these examples cannot play this crucial normative role. While Lange's examples fail to demonstrate the existence of distinctively mathematical explanations, they help to emphasize that many superficially natural scientific explanations rely for their explanatory force on relations of stronger-than-natural necessity. These are not opposing kinds of scientific explanations; they are different aspects of scientific explanation. (shrink)

I argue that Sellars’s naturalization of Kant should be understood in terms of how he used behavioristic psychology and cybernetics. I first explore how Sellars used Edward Tolman’s cognitive-behavioristic psychology to naturalize Kant in the early essay “Language, Rules, and Behavior”. I then turn to Norbert Wiener’s understanding of feedback loops and circular causality. On this basis I argue that Sellars’s distinction between signifying and picturing, which he introduces in “Being and Being Known,” can be understood in terms of what (...) I call cybernetic behaviorism. I interpret picturing in terms of cycles of cybernetic behavior and signifying in terms of coordination between cybernetic behavior systems, or what I call triangulated cybernetic behavior. This leads to a formal, naturalistic understanding of personhood as the capacity to engage in triangulated cybernetic behavior. I conclude by showing that Sellars’s thought has the resources, which he did not exploit, for introducing the concept of second-order cybernetics. This suggests that Sellars’s philosophy of mind could be developed in the direction of autopoiesis and enactivism. (shrink)

This chapter explores the unifying themes of “the Pittsburgh School” of Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell: a social pragmatist account of intentionality, the rejection of the Myth of the Given, and the partial rehabilitation of Hegel for analytic philosophy. In addition this chapter also discusses three points of disagreement within the Pittsburgh School: whether or not we should posit sense-impressions, whether perceptual intentionality is world-relational, and whether the natural sciences have epistemic authority over other ways of thinking about nature. The chapter (...) concludes with a metaphilosophical concern about the status of a return to Hegel within analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy follows an anti-Hegelian neo-Kantian institution of a divide between philosophy and the social and natural sciences. Hegel would reject such a divide, since he conceives of philosophy as investigating “shapes of a world” and not just “shapes of consciousness”. In these terms the Pittsburgh School marks a return to Hegel trimmed to suit the needs of analytic philosophy rather than questioning those needs. (shrink)

Online technologies enable vast amounts of data to outlive their producers online, thereby giving rise to a new, digital form of afterlife presence. Although researchers have begun investigating the nature of such presence, academic literature has until now failed to acknowledge the role of commercial interests in shaping it. The goal of this paper is to analyse what those interests are and what ethical consequences they may have. This goal is pursued in three steps. First, we introduce the concept of (...) the Digital Afterlife Industry, and define it as an object of study. Second, we identify the politico-economic interests of the DAI. For this purpose, we develop an analytical approach based on an informational interpretation of Marxian economics. Third, we explain the practical manifestations of the interests using four real life cases. The findings expose the incentives of the DAI to alter what is referred to as the “informational bodies” of the dead, which in turn is to be seen as a violation of the principle of human dignity. To prevent such consequences, we argue that the ethical conventions that guide trade with remains of organic bodies may serve as a good model for future regulation of DAI. (shrink)

I argue that Sellars’s distinction between signifying and picturing should be taken seriously by philosophers of mind, language, and cognition. I begin with interpretations of key Sellarsian texts in order to show that picturing is best understood as a theory of non-linguistic cognitive representations through which animals navigate their environments. This is distinct from the kind of discursive cognition that Sellars called ‘signifying’ and which is best understood in terms of socio-linguistic inferences. I argue that picturing is required because reflection (...) on signifying cannot adequately explain our need for cognitive friction. I then show how the idea of picturing is further developed by Paul Churchland, Ruth Garrett Millikan, and Huw Price. I finally turn to predictive processing as a theory of cognitive representation, and in particular Andy Clark’s ‘radical predictive processing’, to further characterize picturing. However, doing so has the cost of pushing picturing and signifying further apart than Sellars intended. (shrink)

The web is increasingly inhabited by the remains of its departed users, a phenomenon that has given rise to a burgeoning digital afterlife industry. This industry requires a framework for dealing with its ethical implications. We argue that the regulatory conventions guiding archaeological exhibitions could provide the basis for such a framework.

Luck egalitarianism is a family of egalitarian theories of distributive justice that aim to counteract the distributive effects of luck. This article explains luck egalitarianism's main ideas, and the debates that have accompanied its rise to prominence. There are two main parts to the discussion. The first part sets out three key moves in the influential early statements of Dworkin, Arneson, and Cohen: the brute luck/option luck distinction, the specification of brute luck in everyday or theoretical terms and the specification (...) of advantage as resources, welfare, or some combination of these. The second part covers three later developments: the democratic egalitarian critique of luck egalitarianism, the luck egalitarian acceptance of pluralism, and luck egalitarian doubts about the significance of the brute luck/option luck distinction. (shrink)

I argue that phenomenology should take seriously what Wilfrid Sellars calls “the Myth of the Given”. Phenomenologists have either ignored this idea or misunder-stood it. I argue that the Myth of the Given, if understood correctly, could be an objection to phenomenological method. Specifically I argue that Husserl’s static phenomenology is vulnerable to a Sellarsian criticism. However, I also show that Merleau-Ponty is not vulnerable to a Sellarsian criticism because of how he navigates the relationship between phenomenology and science. This (...) shows that the question as to whether phenomenology is vulnerable to the Sellarsian criticism is more complicated than has been assumed by phenomenologists or their critics. (shrink)

This review article of Shlomi Segall's Health, Luck, and Justice (Princeton University Press, 2010) addresses three issues: first, Segall’s claim that luck egalitarianism, properly construed, does not object to brute luck equality; second, Segall’s claim that brute luck is properly construed as the outcome of actions that it would have been unreasonable to expect the agent to avoid; and third, Segall’s account of healthcare and criticism of rival views. On the first two issues, a more conventional form of luck egalitarianism (...) – that is, one which objects to brute luck even if it creates equality, and which construes brute luck as the inverse of agent responsibility – is defended. On the third issue, strengths and weaknesses in Segall’s criticism of Rawlsian, democratic egalitarian, and all-luck egalitarian approaches to healthcare, and in his own luck egalitarian approach, are identified. (shrink)

Critics of luck egalitarianism have claimed that, far from providing a justification for the public insurance functions of a welfare state as its proponents claim, the view objectionably abandons those who are deemed responsible for their dire straits. This article considers seven arguments that can be made in response to this ‘abandonment objection’. Four of these arguments are found wanting, with a recurrent problem being their reliance on a dubious sufficientarian or quasi-sufficientarian commitment to provide a threshold of goods unconditionally. (...) Three arguments succeed, showing that luck egalitarians have good reasons for assisting ‘negligent victims’ on account of changes that may occur in an individual between the time of their choice and their subsequent disadvantage, bad option luck, and doubts about free will and responsibility. Luck egalitarianism is therefore shown to offer strong support for public insurance. (shrink)

I use the distinction between sentience and sapience to reconstruct the debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell. I argue that Dreyfus's critique of McDowell's conceptualism relies on conflating detached contemplation with conceptual activity as such. I then argue that McDowell's conceptualism can be enriched and brought into deeper conversation with pragmatism and phenomenology if we take reasons to be a special kind of affordance. Contra Dreyfus, reasons need not disrupt affordances but do so only in specific contexts. I conclude (...) with a suggestion about how to understand the emergence of rational animality within the hominid lineage. (shrink)

Discrimination, understood as differential treatment of individuals on the basis of their respective group memberships, is widely considered to be morally wrong. This moral judgment is backed in many jurisdictions with the passage of equality of opportunity legislation, which aims to ensure that racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, sexual-orientation, disability and other groups are not subjected to discrimination. This chapter explores the conceptual underpinnings of discrimination and equality of opportunity using the tools of analytical moral and political philosophy.

Some philosophers writing on the possibility of faultless disagreement have argued that the only way to account for the intuition that there could be disagreements which are faultless in every sense is to accept a relativistic semantics. In this article we demonstrate that this view is mistaken by constructing an absolutist semantics for a particular domain – aesthetic discourse – which allows for the possibility of genuinely faultless disagreements. We argue that this position is an improvement over previous absolutist responses (...) to the relativist's challenge and that it presents an independently plausible account of the semantics of aesthetic discourse. (shrink)

The rise of mechanistic science in the seventeenth century helped give rise to a heated debate about whether teleology—the appearance of purposive activity in life and in mind—could be naturalized. At issue here were both what is meant by “teleology” as well as what is meant “nature”. I shall examine a specific episode in the history of this debate in the twentieth century with the rise of cybernetics: the science of seemingly “self-controlled” systems. Against cybernetics, Hans Jonas argued that cybernetics (...) failed as a naturalistic theory of teleology and that the reality of teleology is grounded in phenomenology, not in scientific explanations. I shall argue that Jonas was correct to criticize cybernetics but that contemporary work in biological organization succeeds where cybernetics failed. I will then turn to contemporary uses of Jonas’s phenomenology in enactivism and argue that Jonas’s phenomenology should be avoided by enactivism as a scientific research program, but that it remains open whether enactivism as a philosophy of nature should also avoid Jonas. (shrink)

Many political philosophers maintain that beneficiaries of injustice are under special obligations to assist victims of injustice. However, the examples favoured by those who endorse this view equally support an alternative luck egalitarian view, which holds that special obligations should be assigned to those with good brute luck. From this perspective the distinguishing features of the benefiting view are (1) its silence on the question of whether to allocate special obligations to assist the brute luck worse off to those who (...) are well off as a matter of brute luck but not as a result of injustice, and (2) its silence on the question of whether to allocate assistance to those who are badly off as a matter of brute luck but not as a result of injustice. In this new light, the benefiting view is harder to justify. (shrink)

Recent accounts of teleological naturalism hold that organisms are intrinsically goaldirected entities. We argue that supporters and critics of this view have ignored the ways in which it is used to address quite different problems. One problem is about biology and concerns whether an organism-centered account of teleological ascriptions would improve our descriptions and explanations of biological phenomena. This is different from the philosophical problem of how naturalized teleology would affect our conception of nature, and of ourselves as natural beings. (...) The neglect of this metatheoretic distinction has made it difficult to understand the criteria we should use for evaluating proposals to naturalize teleology. We argue that a clearer distinction between scientific and philosophical contexts shows that we need more than one set of criteria for evaluating proposals to naturalize teleology, and that taking these into account might advance or dissolve recurring debates in the literature. (shrink)

I argue that Sellars's philosophy of perception can be reconciled with recent work in enactive cognitive science. Sellars's critical realism holds that we perceive physical objects with perceptible properties as causally mediated by how these objects affect our sensory receptors. I argue that this theory, while basically right, downplays the role of embodiment in perception: perception essentially involves sensorimotor abilities. I argue that embodied critical realism can resolve the debate between Coates and Noe.

Arguments from disagreement often take centre stage in debates between competing semantic theories. This paper explores the theoretical basis for arguments from disagreement and, in so doing, proposes methodological principles which allow us to distinguish between legitimate arguments from disagreement and dialectically ineffective arguments from disagreement. In the light of these principles, I evaluate Cappelen and Hawthorne's [2009] argument from disagreement against relativism, and show that it fails to undermine relativism since it is dialectically ineffective. Nevertheless, I argue that an (...) alternative challenge to relativism based on disagreement is available. More generally, I argue that semantic theory is not answerable to data stemming from ‘loaded’ philosophical principles regarding the nature of disagreement. Rather, semantic theorists will exhaust their dialectical responsibilities regarding disagreement if they can demonstrate consistency with a minimal account of the concept. (shrink)

This paper considers issues raised by Elizabeth Anderson’s recent critique of the position she terms ‘luck egalitarianism’. It is maintained that luck egalitarianism, once clarified and elaborated in certain regards, remains the strongest egalitarian stance. Anderson’s arguments that luck egalitarians abandon both the negligent and prudent dependent caretakers fails to account for the moderate positions open to luck egalitarians and overemphasizes their commitment to unregulated market choices. The claim that luck egalitarianism insults citizens by redistributing on the grounds of paternalistic (...) beliefs, pity and envy, and by making intrusive and stigmatizing judgments of responsibility, fails accurately to characterize the luck egalitarian’s rationale for redistribution and relies upon luck egalitarians being insensitive to the danger of stigmatization. The luck egalitarian position is reinforced by the fact that Anderson’s favoured conception of equality, ‘democratic equality’, is counterintuitively indifferent to all unchosen inequalities, including intergenerational inequalities, once bare social minima are met. (shrink)

According to all-luck egalitarianism, the differential distributive effects of both brute luck, which defines the outcome of risks which are not deliberately taken, and option luck, which defines the outcome of deliberate gambles, are unjust. Exactly how to correct the effects of option luck is, however, a complex issue. This article argues that (a) option luck should be neutralized not just by correcting luck among gamblers, but among the community as a whole, because it would be unfair for gamblers as (...) a group to be disadvantaged relative to non-gamblers by bad option luck; (b) individuals should receive the warranted expected results of their gambles, except insofar as individuals blamelessly lacked the ability to ascertain which expectations were warranted; and (c) where societal resources are insufficient to deliver expected results to gamblers, gamblers should receive a lesser distributive share which is in proportion to the expected results. Where all-luck egalitarianism is understood in this way, it allows risk-takers to impose externalities on non-risk-takers, which seems counterintuitive. This may, however, be an advantage as it provides a luck egalitarian rationale for assisting ‘negligent victims’. (shrink)

Abstract McDowell's contributions to epistemology and philosophy of mind turn centrally on his defense of the Aristotelian concept of a ?rational animal?. I argue here that a clarification of how McDowell uses this concept can make more explicit his distance from Davidson regarding the nature of the minds of non-rational animals. Close examination of his responses to Davidson and to Dennett shows that McDowell is implicitly committed to avoiding the following ?false trichotomy?: that animals are not bearers of semantic content (...) at all, that they are bearers of content in the same sense we are, and that they are bearer of "as if" content. Avoiding the false trichotomy requires that we understand non-rational animals as having concepts but not as making judgments. Furthermore, we need to supplement McDowell's distinction between the logical spaces of reasons and of the realm of law with what Finkelstein calls ?the logical space of animate life?. Though McDowell has taken some recent steps to embrace a view like this, I urge a more demanding conception than what McDowell has thus far suggested. (shrink)